ignored the EAC executive director's opinion letter concluding the same. The agency commissioners, for their part, had deadlocked on the interpretive question. In the decision's wake, Arizona, joined by Kansas, is currently engaged in litigation against the EAC under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 9 While Intertribal can be understood as a case about federalism, constitutional, or substantive election law, this article analyzes Intertribal through the lens of administrative law. In doing so, it foregrounds an otherwise background electoral administrative agency, the EAC, and uses the case as a springboard to explore broader themes relevant to federal election administration. 10 In particular, it puzzles through various analytical issues that arise when courts are called upon to resolve agency deadlocks on questions of statutory interpretation. In light of such deadlocks, this article proposes an institutional understanding of Skidmore deference to interpretive documents prepared by politically insulated actors within election-related administrative agencies. 11 Judicial deference, it posits, should give weight to the relative independence of agency staff when politically appointed officials are otherwise deadlocked. To be clear, the claim is not that staff opinions and other guidance documents would require deference or overrule those of appointed commissioners. Rather, the argument emphasizes that such views constitute an oft-overlooked source of expertise that would be prudent for judges to consider in electoral disputes.
This approach would help to vindicate otherwise under-enforced constitutional norms by flipping the conventional wisdom granting greater interpretive deference to more politically accountable actors -in situations where such actors have failed, on partisan grounds, to resolve a statutory ambiguity themselves. In this manner, the proposal is a second-best solution for courts required to resolve a statutory ambiguity when first-best answers are unavailable due to institutional constraints and internal agency politics. As such, the proposal seeks to create greater incentives for internal agency independence in the presence of partisan deadlocks, as well as for the development of agency expertise through sub-regulatory materials - 9 See Kobach v. The United States Election Assistance Commission, 13-cv-04095 (D Kan 2013). 10 The sphere of election administration, as defined here, includes the administration of statutes related to the conduct of elections, including the regulation of activities leading up to an election as well as those that occur on Election Day itself -a scope that parallels that of many administrative agencies abroad. See Part 0.A. Others have adopted narrower definitions, but usually to address a different set of issues than those pursued here. See, for example, Daniel P. Tokaji, Teaching Election Administration, 56 St Louis U L J 675, 675 (2012) (citing "voting technology, voter registration, voter identification, and the conduct of recounts" as representative election administration issues); David Schleicher, From Here All-The-Way-Down or How to Write a Festschrift Piece, 48 Tulsa L Rev 401, 406 (2013) (defining "election administration" in terms of the "plumbing of the electoral system -vote counting, manning the polls, locating polling places, etc.). 11 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US 134, 140 (1944) .
non-binding, but informative, guidance documents such as agency manuals, advisory notices, or opinion letters. 12 To develop these ideas, Part I critically examines Intertribal's background and reasoning. Part II surveys federal election-related agencies and notes that many are structured to deadlock on partisan grounds. Part III then considers how courts should treat reviewable election agency deadlocks, and in particular, how judges can benefit from agency expertise to resolve such ties. Finally, Part IV reflects more broadly on how administrative law principles might be tailored to the electoral context.
I. INTERTRIBAL'S IMPASSE
In December 2005, the Arizona Secretary of State's office sent an email to the EAC with an inquiry. The year before, Arizona voters had passed a ballot initiative requiring that voting registrants provide proof of their citizenship. 13 Acceptable proof under the new state law included the applicant's birth certificate or passport, naturalization papers, or driver's license number. 14 The Secretary of State asked whether the EAC could add this new Arizona requirement to the federal mail-in registration form that the EAC had developed under the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). 15 The federal form contained a section of state-specific instructions notifying state residents of what additional information they had to provide in order to register. 16 The agency's Executive Director refused Arizona's request. 17 His letter reasoned that the NVRA mandates that states "shall accept and use the mail voter registration application prescribed by the [EAC] ." 18 Accordingly, the new Arizona requirements did not alter the state's voter qualifications, but rather constituted an additional evidentiary requirement for a preexisting qualification (citizenship). Such a state-imposed requirement on the federal form would effectively result in Arizona's refusal to "accept and use" the EAC's form as required by the NVRA. 19 In the director's view, states could not condition voter registration on the submission of materials beyond those exclusively demanded by the federal form. The NVRA "regulated the area" and therefore preempted the state's conflicting requirements. 20 Despite this opinion letter, Arizona's Secretary of State rejected the director's interpretation and continued to enforce the state law to require the submission of proof-of-citizenship along with the federal form. 21 The conflict continued in both the agency and the courts. In May 2006, a consolidated group of plaintiffs, including private individuals, Indian tribes, and nonpartisan advocacy groups filed suit in district court to enjoin various practices under the state law. The Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' emergency interlocutory injunction, only to later have the injunction vacated by the Supreme Court in Purcell v. Gonzalez. 22 In a per curiam opinion, the Court emphasized the imminence of the then-upcoming election and the Court of Appeals' failure to defer to the findings of the district court (which had not yet issued any factual findings and, as a result, left the Supreme Court with nothing more than a "bare order" to review). 23 After further litigation, 24 a three-judge panel and the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc eventually held that the NVRA preempted Arizona's conflicting law under the Elections Clause; Arizona could not require the submission of proof-of-citizenship along with the federal registration form. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 25 As the case was winding its way to the Court, the EAC's four commissioners considered the legal matter in July 2006. Their deliberations resulted in a debilitating tie: two commissioners (Democratic nominations) voted against the change and two (Republication nominations) voted in favor. 26 Because the proposal required three votes for approval, 27 . 23 Gonzalez, 549 US at 5-6. 24 On remand, the appellate court affirmed the district court's initial denial of a preliminary injunction and held that the NVRA did not supersede Arizona's state law. 485 F3d at 1049-51. The trial court therefore granted summary judgment to Arizona. 25 568 U.S. __ (2012) . 26 statements regarding the basis for their votes, underscoring the contentiousness of the outcome. 28 After the agency's deadlocked vote, Arizona took no further action with respect to the EAC -a fact Justice Scalia later emphasized at oral argument and in his eventual majority opinion. 29 Justice Scalia agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the NVRA's "accept and use" provision precluded state-imposed registration requirements without EAC approval. On the one hand, Congress could preemptively regulate how federal elections were conducted under the Elections Clause; in this sense, the so-called presumption against preemption did not apply. Rather, Congress' power under the Election's Clause was broad. Its substantive reach extended over the "times, places, and manner" of federal elections -"comprehensive words" which "embrace authority to provide a comprehensive code for congressional elections," including regulations over federal voter registration. 30 On the other hand, the Court also made clear that states retained the power to determine which voters were qualified to vote, potentially limiting previous case law regarding the scope of Congress' ability to determine voter qualifications. 31 How and where to draw this line -between a substantive qualification and a mere procedural regulation over the "manner" of federal elections subject to federal oversight -will almost surely be the subject of future litigation. One argument left open to Arizona on this question (but raised too late in the case) was that the state's proofof-citizenship registration requirement was itself a qualification to vote. 32 Justice Scalia suggested another possibility as well: that the state's authority to establish voter qualifications also included the power to demand the information required for the state's effective enforcement of its own qualifications. 33 Pointing to another NVRA provision declaring that the EAC-prescribed application "may require only such identifying 28 Commissioner Ray Martinez, III, a Democratic nominee, argued that reversing the agency's previous legal position regarding the NVRA would create inconsistencies and confusion in other states and was, in any event, premature given the likelihood of pending judicial resolution. Finally, he worried about the EAC's institutional credibility. Until this vote, the EAC commissioners had always been able to achieve unanimity, and he feared that the outcome would be perceived as an "overly partisan federal agency that is more prone to deadlock" than to fulfilling its mission. Joint Appendix, 2012 WL 6198263 at 229-39.
Commissioner Paul DeGregorio, the EAC chairman and a Republican nominee, expressed his agreement with a district court opinion considering the issue and concluded that Arizona's attempt to require proof-ofcitizenship did not violate the NVRA. Id at 223. He cited his own personal experience as an election administrator in recounting registration applications that could not be finalized due to voters' failure to supply missing information. Thus, "leaving out key instructions on the National Voter Registration Form was likely to cause more steps for the voters and possibly keep them from being able to cast a ballot." Id at 224-25. In his view, consolidating the federal and state requirements into one form would be more efficient and increase the number of validly cast ballots. 29 Inter Tribal Council, No 12-71, slip op at 16-17. 30 Id at 16-17. 31 Id at 13. See, for example, Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970) . 32 Inter Tribal Council, No 12-71, slip op at 15 n 9. 33 Id at 15. information" as is "necessary" to determine "eligibility," 34 Justice Scalia suggested that the statute might be read to require the inclusion of information essential to meaningful enforcement. In this manner, he effectively encouraged Arizona to bring suit (which it did) arguing that the EAC had a "nondiscretionary duty" to include citizenship information as "necessary" to enforce Arizona's voter qualifications. 35 EAC's inaction on or arbitrary rejection of the claim would then be subject to judicial review under the APA. 36 In a footnote, Justice Scalia further noted that the EAC lacked any active commissioners at the time, and wondered whether a court could compel agency action despite the agency's lack of leadership. 37 For Justices Thomas and Alito, in dissent, the questions raised by Intertribal did not need to be resolved in administrative forums like the EAC, but rather could and should be settled in courts without bureaucratic involvement. Justice Alito, for his part, accused the majority of "send [ing] the State to traverse a veritable procedural obstacle course." 38 Justice Thomas agreed. 39 Both Justices then took pains to point out that the EAC at the time was plagued by vacancies, with the lack of a quorum rendering the commission but an "empty shell." 40 Intertribal can thus be seen as an attempt by the majority to shift back to an administrative agency, rather than a court, questions it thought better suited for an initial administrative determination. Among them: What kind of scheme -attestation backed by perjury prosecutions or formal documentation -is "necessary" for legitimately establishing voter eligibility? What kind of information would properly "effectuate" a citizenship requirement? Answers to such questions would require data and evidence that agencies would be better situated to gather relative to judicial forums, subject to the constraints of administrative law. 34 Id at 12, 15-17. 35 Id at 16-17. 36 Inter Tribal Council, No 12-71, slip op at 16-17. 37 Id. at 17, n. 10. 38 Id at 6 (Alito dissenting). 39 Inter Tribal Council, No 12-71, slip op 16-17 (Thomas dissenting) ("Offering a nonexistent pathway to administrative relief is an exercise in futility, not constitutional avoidance."). 40 Id at 17 (Thomas dissenting); id at 6 (Alito dissenting). Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy wrote separately to emphasize his view that the presumption against preemption should play no less of a role in the electoral context. Id at 1-2 (Kennedy concurring). To him, the cautionary presumption played an important part when interpreting a federal statute's boundaries and the Elections Clause was no different than other enumerated powers like the commerce or bankruptcy power, where the presumption still applied. Justice Kennedy also made a pragmatic observation: States largely bear the expenses of holding federal elections, since state and federal election processes usually overlap in practice. The same voters usually use the same ballots, that is, when choosing both state and federal officials. As a result, states still maintained an important interest in federal elections given this administrative overlap. Id at 2.
II. ELECTION-RELATED AGENCIES
As context, American federal elections are currently administered by a patchwork of federal agencies in collaboration with state and local governments, which still bear the bulk of administrative responsibilities on the ground. 41 While states are constitutionally charged with providing for the "times, places, and manner" of federal elections in the first instance, Congress has exercised its power to "make or alter" these regulations selectively -most notably in the areas of campaign finance, 42 antidiscrimination, 43 ballot provision, 44 vote-counting-technology, and voter registration by both domestic 45 and overseas voters. 46 While these federal responsibilities are non-trivial, it is worth noting that they pale in comparison to the more comprehensive and centralized schemes of other countries. 47 Congress, in turn, has delegated many of these election-related responsibilities to a constellation of federal administrative agencies, notable for their structural and substantive heterogeneity. Some of these agencies, 41 44 The 1975 Amendments to VRA require jurisdictions to provide ballots and instructions in language of covered language-minority groups when particular population conditions exist. A number of federal statutes concern electoral access by the disabled, including the 1982 amendment to the VRA, the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984. 45 for example, have traditionally independent features such as for-cause removal restrictions and multi-member boards, while others are more recognizably executive in nature through at-will removal of their agency heads by the President. 48 At the fore, these agencies include the EAC involved in Intertribal, the Federal Election Commission, the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense. 49 
A. Independent Commissions
More specifically, the EAC and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) are both independent agencies with a distinctive design feature: both are normally headed by an even number of commissioners with staggered terms, equally split between two political parties in practice. Specifically, the EAC usually consists of four members, two of whom are Republicans and two of whom are Democrats. 50 Each serves four-year staggered terms. 51 The EAC commissioners, in turn, choose a chair and vice chair, who also cannot be from the same political party. 52 The FEC is similarly composed of six members with six-year staggered terms, no more than three of whom can be affiliated with the same political party. 53 56 As a substantive matter, HAVA granted the EAC the authority to disburse payments to states to replace voting systems as well as to provide guidance regarding voting system standards, testing, and certification. More generally, the statute directs the EAC to serve as a "clearinghouse" for election administration data and best practices. 57 HAVA explicitly denies the EAC authority, however, to issue any rules or regulations under the statute, 58 except in the narrow context of the mail-in voting process at issue in Intertribal. 59 The Attorney General, in turn, is authorized to enforce the statute and bring suits for declaratory or injunctive relief accordingly. 60 2. Federal Election Commission. -Apart from its six commissioners, the FEC also has a staff director and general counsel appointed by the commission, an inspector general, a chief financial officer, as well as a chief information officer. 61 Substantively, the FEC administers the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which imposes caps on election spending, limits individual candidate contributions, and requires 54 See 2 USC § 437c(a)(5) ("The Commission shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members . . . for a term of one year . . . . The chairman and the vice chairman shall not be affiliated with the same political party."). 55 J 190, 191 (2013) ("Unlike most federal independent agencies, the EAC was created as a non-regulatory body, designed primarily to serve as a national clearinghouse of election administration best practices and to distribute federal funds to state and local jurisdictions."). 58 42 USC § 15329 ("The Commission shall not have any authority to issue any rule, promulgate any regulation, or take any other action which imposes any requirement on any State or unit of local government, except to the extent permitted under [the mail-in voter registration form provision]."). 59 See 42 USC § 1973gg-7(a). 60 various candidate and political action committee disclosures. 62 The Commission administers the provisions through both rulemaking and adjudication and facilitates enforcement actions in conjunction with the DOJ. 63 The FEC also periodically issues advisory opinions, which are generated in response to requests by parties, candidates, and other potentially regulated entities. 64 *** Formal agency action for both the EAC and FEC, in turn, normally requires the bi-partisan majority approval of the agencies' commissioners. The FEC, for its part, requires a majority of commissioners to agree when making, amending, or repealing rules; issuing advisory opinions; or approving enforcement actions. 65 This requirement usually requires the assent of four of the FEC's six commissioners. 66 The EAC, in turn, requires three-member approval for its actions -typically a majority of its four commissioners. 67 When coupled with the agency's partisan balancing requirements, these voting rules help to ensure that the agencies deadlock in the absence of bipartisan agreement. Moreover, a tie-vote for the FEC and EAC means that the proposed action does not proceed. By contrast, a tievote for the International Trade Commission (one of the only other rulemaking agencies with an even-numbered, bipartisan commission structure) means that an investigation proceeds. 68 As such, both the FEC and EAC are structurally biased in favor of the status quo. On the one hand, these agencies' bipartisan-vote requirements reflect lofty legislative aspirations. The FECA House Report, for example, cites the dangers of "partisan misuse" and the hope that the FEC's majorityvote requirement would help to ensure a "mature and considered judgment." 70 On the other hand, the decision rules also invites intractable impasses, particularly over significant and high-profile issues. 71 The EAC, for example, deadlocked 2-2 on Intertribal's question of whether to include Arizona's proof-of-citizenship requirements on the federal registration form. One commenter derided the outcome as a "partisan stalemate" in the "one area" where the agency had regulatory authority. 72 
B. Executive Agencies
By comparison, there are also two prominent executive agencies with single presidentially-appointed and senate-confirmed heads, the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense. While both federal agencies also regulate elections, their scope and structure differ from the FEC and EAC in important ways.
1. Department of Justice -The Department of Justice has been charged with helping to enforce a number of election-related statutes, including (what is left of) the Voting Rights Act (VRA). 73 Before Shelby Rights, not more than four of whom can be from the same political party). The Commission on Civil Rights is primarily a fact-finding agency and periodically issues reports regarding civil rights policy and enforcement, serves as an information clearinghouse, and prepares public service announcement and advertising campaigns to discourage civil rights violations. See 42 USC § 1975a. 69 Marian Wang, As Political Groups Push Envelope, FEC Gridlock Gives "De Facto Green Light" (ProPublica Nov 7, 2011), online at http://www.propublica.org/article/as-political-donors-push-envelope-fec-gridlock-givesde-facto-green-light/single (visited Jan 10, 2014) ("Ultimately, the FEC is set up in such a way that when the commissioners deadlock, one side comes away with a de-facto win -the side seeking to preserve the status quo."). 70 71 See Garrett, Deadlocked Votes at 4 (cited in note 65) ("Those issues on which deadlocks occurred . . . featured strong disagreement among Commissioners and reflected apparently unsettled positions on some major policy questions, such as political committee status, when particular activities triggered filing requirements or other regulation, and questions related to investigations and other enforcement matters. In addition, the deadlocks that did occur always fell along partisan lines."). 72 See Tokaji, 28 Yale L & Pol Rev at 135 (cited in note 6). See also Gueorguieva, 13 Geo Pub Pol Rev at 101-02; Press Release, FEC Deadlocks On Attempted Evasion of Disclosure Laws (Campaign Legal Center June 14, 2012), online at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1766:june-14-2012-fecdeadlocks-on-attempted-evasion-of-disclosure-laws&catid=63:legal-center-press-releases&Itemid=61 (visited Jan 10, 2014). 73 In addition to the VRA discussed here, the Attorney General is also authorized to bring civil actions to enforce a number of other election-related statutes, such as the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act's provisions requiring states to provide uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology.
County invalidated VRA Section Four's coverage formula, 74 the agency administered Section Five's preclearance regime for jurisdictions covered by the formula. Those jurisdictions had to affirmatively demonstrate that the changes would "neither ha[ve] the purpose nor . . . the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 75 While covered jurisdictions could submit their voting changes to the DOJ or a federal district court in Washington, D.C., more than 99 percent of the preclearance requests were submitted for DOJ administrative review. 76 The current case law would make it difficult for the DOJ to successfully claim legislative rulemaking authority under Section Fiveand indeed the DOJ has not done so, explicitly treating its regulations as guidelines. 77 Moreover, Section Five provides that litigants can bypass the DOJ administrative process to vindicate their claims directly in a judicial forum, further suggesting that Congress intended for the courts to play a primary interpretive role as well; the DOJ's own regulations refer to the DOJ as a judicial "surrogate." 78 Finally, the text of Section Five also does not explicitly grant DOJ rulemaking power, 79 and the Attorney General's preclearance denial letters lack precedential value. 80 While Section Five is currently a hollow shell in Shelby County's wake, the DOJ also enforces Section Two of the VRA, which bans electoral structures that result in members of a class of citizens defined by race or color "hav[ing] less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 81 As such, Section Two is a nationally applicable prohibition against voting practices and procedures that discriminate on the basis of race, color, or language minority group. It has been used, for example, to challenge redistricting plans and at-large election systems, poll worker hiring, and voter registration procedures. It prohibits not only electionrelated practices that are intended to be racially discriminatory, but also 74 80 See United States v Mead Corp, 533 US 218, 232 (denying Chevron deference to tariff rulings on the grounds that they were not "the legislative type of activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling"). See also Krousser, 86 Tex L Rev at 683 (cited in note 155) (characterizing DOJ as restricted to the issuance of guidelines as opposed to "rules" and noting that "its objection letters [do] not have precedential force"). those that are shown to have a racially discriminatory impact. 82 The Act allows the Attorney General, as well as private citizens, to bring suit to obtain court-ordered remedies. 83 The provision does not explicitly provide the DOJ with binding rulemaking authority, nor does the DOJ claim any. 84 Finally, in terms of staffing, what is striking about the DOJ is the extent to which many of the agency's election-related administrative duties are carried out by its career civil servants. The Civil Rights Division within the DOJ, for example, contains a dedicated Voting Section, which has had about 35-40 career attorneys at any given time. 85 In all, the unit has about a hundred employees, comprising attorneys, social scientists, civil rights analysts, and support personnel. 86 2. Department of Defense -Like the DOJ, the Department of Defense (DOD) is another executive branch agency, with a presidentiallynominated and senate-confirmed head. The DOD has sub-delegated its election-related duties, however, to the director of the DOD's Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP). 87 Substantively, FVAP is charged with administering statutes related to voting by citizens and military personnel overseas. 88 The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, for example, provides for a federal registration application, which allows qualified citizens abroad to register to vote and request an absentee ballot simultaneously. 89 Other FVAP responsibilities include developing and implementing voter registration procedures at army recruitment offices. 90 82 42 USC § § 1973-1973bb-1. 83 42 USC § 1973. 84 42 USC § 1973. The DOJ also helps to administer other lesser-known sections of the VRA, including Sections 3 and Section 8, which grant both the federal courts and the Attorney General the authority to certify counties to allow for the assignment of federal election observers, which can include DOJ staff. 42 USC § 1973(b). Sections 203 and 4(f)(4), in turn, are the language minority provisions of the Act, which require covered jurisdictions to provide bilingual written materials. 42 USC § 1973aa-1a(a). The DOJ has issued a guidance document to facilitate compliance. See 28 CFR 55, online at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_203/28CFRPart55.pdf (visited Jan 10, 2014). Finally, Section 208 of the Act, allows voters who require assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write to receive that assistance by an individual of the voters' choosing-as long as the individual is not the voter's employer or union representative. 42 USC § 1973aa-6. 85 See Department of Justice, Review of the Voting Section at 9 (cited in note 76). The number of attorneys during this time has fluctuated slightly beyond this range, with 31 attorneys in 1998 and 45 in 2010. 86 Id (cited in note 76). 87 V 2012) ). Pursuant to these authorities, the DOD has issued guidance establishing its polices and assigning responsibilities for implementing
III. DEFERENCE AND DEADLOCKS
With independent commissions structured to deadlock and executive branch agencies largely deprived of legislative rulemaking power, the emerging portrait of federal election administration is one in which some of the most important election-related statutes are being implemented, if at all, by courts. Federal administrators, by contrast, have been relegated to the sidelines despite their ability to collect cross-cutting data from multiple sources and to provide expert guidance beyond that provided by selfinterested litigants.
This Part considers how courts should interpret election-related statutes in light of agencies' comparative expertise and structural incentives to deadlock. It suggests that deference should be calibrated to the institutional role of the actors authoring the interpretive documents and, specifically, the degree to which they are internally politically insulated. In this sense, it seeks to develop the idea of internal agency independence and, in doing so, to help foster legitimate tie-breaking considerations.
A. Tie-breakers
Agency deadlocks of the kind that plagued the EAC in Intertribal pose an especially pernicious set of problems for election administration, and administrative law more generally. Deadlocks stymie the often swift and decisive resolution critically necessary before an impending election, especially given the risks of instability or perceived illegitimacy. Some, for example, have defended the Supreme Court's intervention in Bush v. Gore on the grounds that, barring all else, it provided a final resolution that helped to preserve stability and order. 91 In Intertribal, the imminence of Arizona's impending election was cited to justify an expedited agency procedure in the hopes of providing a final resolution for various states. 92 Administrative deadlocks also undermine the implementation of duly-enacted laws and judicial decisions. In this sense, they can foil otherwise legitimate acts through administrative impasse. Deadlocks resulting in agency inaction can also have pernicious electoral consequences. To take one extreme example, because Illinois politicians in the early 1960s deadlocked over a new redistricting plan for the state legislature in light of new census data, all 236 candidates for 177 seats ended up running together in a single, at-large race. 93 More recently, the FEC has witnessed a string of 3-3 votes along party lines, with some empirical evidence suggesting a recent uptick in deadlocks for proposed enforcement actions, audits, and rulemakings. 94 Among the most controversial have been those preventing the FEC from promulgating meaningful disclosure rules in response to Citizens United, which upheld the statutory disclosure provisions at issue. 95 At one point, the impasse was so protracted that the commissioners could not even agree to accept public comments, though it eventually issued broad questions about possible regulatory approaches. 96 A final rule has yet to be issued.
The twin challenges for federal election administration, then, are how to facilitate the application of high-quality information to the development of electoral regulatory policy while also resolving agency impasse. While exogenous changes such as different voting rules could be ameliorative, doctrinal innovations may be warranted instead when institutional reforms are unlikely. 97 One reason this approach may be prudent in the election context is that achieving legislative agreement on election reform may be difficult, if not impossible, without attached conditions such as the even-numbered bipartisan boards that lead to deadlock in the first place.
Such design choices for election-related agencies like the FEC and EAC likely reflect the congressional desire to ensure that controversial election policies do not proceed unless it serves the interests of both parties as reflected in a bipartisan majority vote. But, while bipartisan consensus would be the first-best outcome, what is a court to do when required to review the conflicting statutory interpretations of split commissioners in constitutional or APA-based suits -should it determine the issue itself or defer to a particular agency actor? Answering this question requires a comparative analysis of the institutional competencies of agency and judicial actors in election-related interpretation. Absent the first-best bipartisan decision, courts should search for second-best solutions by seeking guidance from actors more experienced with the statute's administration.
The situation frequently arises when the underlying statute itself provides for judicial review of a deadlocked decision or, alternatively, when the suit is brought on constitutional grounds. In Democratic Congressional Campaign Commission (DCCC) v. FEC, for example, the D.C. Circuit observed that the Federal Election Campaign Act allowed for judicial review of agency proceedings that resulted in complaint dismissals. 98 As background, FEC enforcement proceedings are initiated either by a complaint filed with the FEC, usually by a candidate or political party, or by the FEC itself after its review of political committee reports. 99 Once initiated, the General Counsel's office evaluates the matter and provides a recommendation to the six-member Commission indicating whether there is "reason to believe" a violation has occurred or is about to occur. Should a majority of the Commission concur with the General Counsel's finding, the FEC then attempts to reach a conciliation agreement through informal negotiation with the potential violators. If negotiation does not resolve the matter, then the Commission can work with the DOJ to file suit in district court. 100 Under this scheme, the DCCC plaintiffs had filed a complaint alleging that the National Republican Campaign Committee had improperly failed to allocate the cost of a mailing campaign against the relevant FECA spending cap. The complaint's validity turned on whether the mailer constituted an "electioneering message." The FEC's General Counsel found reason to believe that it was, based on two previous commission advisory opinions interpreting the statutory term. When the FEC voted, however, only three Commissioners agreed. With four votes required for further action, the complaint was dismissed. 101 In litigation, the FEC argued that the deadlock should be unreviewable since it purportedly resolved no substantive issue. 102 The court pointed out, however, that dismissals based on 5-1 or even 6-0 votes could similarly fail to resolve a decision substantively since the basis for the votes are often unclear. Perhaps the votes were the product of logrolling, legal uncertainty or a judgment that the decision should be deferred; as a result, the FEC's argument rang hollow. In the alternative, the FEC argued that deadlocks were merely unreviewable exercises of prosecutorial discretion in deciding not to pursue a complaint. Again, however, the court rejected the argument on the grounds that 3-3 deadlocks could not be distinguished from 6-0 decisions to dismiss a complaint, decisions that were clearly reviewable under FECA.
As a result, the D.C. Circuit then took an intra-agency disagreement between an insulated internal actor -the General Counsel -and a split commission as reason to take closer look at the proffered legal rationales of both sets of actors. Specifically, it held that when the FEC's General Counsel recommends an affirmative agency action but the agency's politically-appointed commissioners deadlock on the recommendation, the commissioners must provide a statement of reviewable reasons. 103 Importantly, this reason-giving requirement was justified, at least initially, only in situations when the internal staff actor disagreed with the deadlocked commission.
Without this requirement, the panel noted, it would be impossible for a court to "intelligently determine" whether the commissioners were acting contrary to law or in an arbitrary-and-capricious manner. 104 The 100 2 USC § 437g(a)(1)-(2). 101 FEC, that is, sent worrisome signals of arbitrariness in the form of "conflicting messages" when the FEC dismissed a complaint without a rationale, despite seemingly contrary precedents identified by the FEC's own General Counsel. 105 A later D.C. Circuit opinion offered other policy justifications for the requirement: it helped to ensure intra-agency reflection and deliberation, contributed to better reasoned outcomes, and also provided an opportunity for agency self-correction. 106 Indeed, one way to understand this common law requirement is in terms of the court's recognition that a conflict between a senior career staff member (here, the General Counsel with a reputation for independence 107 ) and a deadlocked board merited closer review of the latter. By imposing a reason-giving requirement, the court helped to ensure that the agency's internal expertise could be brought to bear on the commission's eventual resolution.
The next critical question that arises, then, is which interpretive statement of reasons courts should review and grant deference to, if at all. Possibilities include the initial interpretation of the FEC's General Counsel, the separate opinions of the commissioners, or a de novo interpretation by the court itself. Of these, the D.C. Circuit has puzzlingly held that statements issued by the bloc of commissioners voting against agency enforcement should constitute the prevailing interpretation and, what is more, that they would be entitled to Chevron deference -that is, deference to "permissible" interpretations of statutes that are otherwise ambiguous. 108 The court's first premise was that the commissioners who voted to dismiss the complaint "constitute[d] a controlling group" and thus its "rationale necessarily states the agency's reasons for acting as it did." 109 Note, however, that the dismissing group comprised the "controlling" faction only because the decision to pursue the enforcement required a majority.
The court further reasoned that Chevron deference was due since the underlying statute itself evinced a legislative intent to delegate that interpretive authority and the agency exercised that authority. 110 Such intent can ordinarily be inferred when Congress grants an agency the power to act with the force of law through formalized procedures like notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication, and the agency employed 105 Id at 1133. 106 those procedures. 111 Because FECA's adjudicatory scheme was analogous to formal adjudication in essentially creating an adversarial process between the FEC's General Counsel and the respondent, 112 the D.C. Circuit reasoned that Chevron applied to the controlling opinions of deadlocked decisions. The court further noted, even more oddly, that the "Commission is inherently bipartisan in that no more than three of its six voting members may be of the same political party" as further reason for deference. 113 The D.C. Circuit's approach, however, fails to appreciate electionspecific concerns amidst the structure of agencies like the FEC. Namely, it does not recognize that a deadlocked vote within an election-related agency is functionally different than a majority vote in favor of complaint dismissal, which would constitute an affirmative, bipartisan decision not to enforce the statute in a particular way. Whereas a majority vote in the election setting connotes party agreement, a deadlock suggests the converse: a vote split along party lines. Such an outcome is particularly problematic in election administration since a deadlock in favor of inaction and the status quo can privilege incumbents who were elected according to the existing rules.
Framed in this way, it becomes easier to see why courts should not grant Chevron deference to the deadlock coalition that successfully blocks the agency determination. First, as a doctrinal matter, an agency must affirmatively exercise its power to act with the force of law in order to receive deference. 114 To the contrary, an FEC deadlock is not an exercise of lawmaking authority and thus does not warrant judicial respect when hamstrung along party lines. Second, the rationale of Chevron is firmly grounded in presumed legislative intent (however fictional). 115 As a result, granting deference to a non-majority block of a deadlocked panel would be contrary to what Congress intended by creating a majority voting rule on a bipartisan commission. Finally, from a more dynamic perspective, granting Chevron deference to an agency tie blunts the incentives of commissioners to seek bipartisan consensus; by contrast, withholding such deference until a majority is achieved is more likely to foster the cooperation across party lines that Congress desired.
B. Internal Independence
If Chevron is misplaced when agencies deadlock, courts are then left to evaluate the persuasiveness of agency interpretations for themselves, pursuant to what is known as Skidmore deference. 116 Under this test, courts look at a number of Skidmore factors such as the "thoroughness" of the agency's consideration, the reasoning's "validity" and "consistency" and, more generally, any factors which give an interpretation power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 117 The analysis applies even when the agency itself is not a party, as was the case with the EAC in Intertribal. Given the unique concerns of federal election administration, the primary Skidmore factor in the electoral setting should be the extent to which the agency actor is institutionally insulated from partisan influence. Instead of blindly allowing the default controlling bloc to definitively interpret an underlying statute, that is, courts should look instead at the interpretation of the actor most likely to bring to bear the agency's expertise and administrative experience.
While this approach would not necessarily modify Skidmore's multi-factor analysis as such, it would shift its emphasis and place the identity of the decision-maker in the foreground when the agency regulates elections. 118 Such Skidmore inquiries, for example, would look at indicia of political independence, such as tenure and salary protections, methods of appointment, and the degree of professionalization, among other dimensions. It would apply to the myriad informal ways in which insulated agency actors attempt to provide guidance drawn from their expertise. Internally insulated expertise, for example, is frequently generated by career staff within agencies, primarily through sub-regulatory informal guidance documents. There are both senior career officials who hold positions in the Senior Executive Service or otherwise upper management General Schedule positions as well as the more "rank-and-file career workforce." 119 In 116 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US 134 (1944) . Skidmore considered whether the time workers spent on call for a packing plant constituted "working time" due overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In an amicus brief, the Department of Labor's Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division (who had previously issued interpretive bulletins applying the statutory provision to various hypothetical situations) opined that only some of that time could be categorized as such. While lower courts had ignored the Administrator's views, the Supreme Court recognized that such views could be informed by the agency's expertise and experience. 117 Id. at 140. 118 This emphasis would help to guide courts application of Skidmore, which can otherwise be less directed and more ad hoc. See Kristen E. Hickman and Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum L Rev 1235, 1291 (2007) (observing that the "appellate courts seem to believe that Skidmore review represents something more than mere totality of the circumstances evaluation," though they "are uncertain as to precisely what that something is"). 119 See Johnson and Libecap at 7 (cited in note 134). The General Schedule is the basic pay schedule for federal government employees. See 5 USC § 5332. While these lines are somewhat arbitrary, another possibility for drawing the line between senior and junior career employees would follow the Supreme Court's approach in United States v National Treasury Employees Union engaging in a First Amendment analysis of an honoraria ban by crudely distinguishing between "high-level" and "rank-and-file" staff as those above and below General addition to career staff, agencies also often use advisory committees to provide technical advice or recommendations, subject to federal laws regulating the disclosure and openness of meetings. 120 While courts currently do not apply formal deference doctrines to advisory committees, courts could critically review agency rejections of expert advisory committee opinions, especially when those opinions are required by statute. 121 This institutional approach is especially appropriate in federal election administration given its heightened concerns over self-dealing and partisanship. While Skidmore speaks broadly of the "agency," treating the "agency" as a monolithic entity makes little sense here. In Peter Strauss' words, the "anthropomorphic tendency to treat agencies as if they were a single human actor is particularly distracting and distorting when one is analyzing a medium that the constituent elements of complex institutions use to speak to each other." 122 Indeed, agencies operate according to sophisticated internal decision-making processes and personnel decisions often informed by the very expertise-related factors that courts attempt to otherwise address in an institutional vacuum. One important way that judges, like ordinary individuals, evaluate the persuasiveness or credibility of an analysis is by looking at the author's identity and the related probability of bias and/or sound expertise. Expert witnesses in court, for example, are regularly called upon to disclose their conflicts-of-interest and related professional background. 123 The notion of looking at the institutional role of the interpretive actor when deciding whether and how to grant deference is not new. The perspective has been advanced by two current members of the Court, among others. Justice Scalia's dissent in United States v. Mead Corporation, for example, advocated for a deference regime that would simply look to whether the interpretation is "authoritative" in the sense that it "represents the official position of the agency." 124 123 See, for example, FRCP 26(a)(2) (requiring, among other things, "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them," "the facts or data considered by the witness," and "the witness's qualifications"). 124 See 121 S Ct at 2187. view was appropriate. Developing this idea of looking at the "who" as opposed to the "how" of agency decision-making, David Barron and nowJustice Elena Kagan have similarly argued that courts should give Chevron deference when the "congressional delegatee" identified by statute "takes personal responsibility for the decision." 125 Such an approach, they contend, would encourage more accountable and well-considered agency decision-making consistent with Chevron's underlying policy goals. 126 While these proposals are Chevron-centered, there are good reasons to extend the conceptual move to the Skidmore context as well, particularly when the regulatory domain is that of federal election administration. Unlike Chevron's grounding in hypothetical legislative intent, Skidmore's foundations are prudential. 127 Skidmore deference recognizes that courts are well-equipped to engage in statutory interpretation, but that they can also lack the experience and expertise to appreciate the consequences of alternative interpretations. As such, Skidmore asks judges to weigh the reasons why an interpretation is persuasive based in part on its source or "pedigree." 128 Granting Skidmore deference when an informal guidance document or letter is prepared and signed by an expert, insulated career staff member would privilege the myriad documents and informal guidance reviewed by the most experienced actors within an agency, while also incorporating the experiences and insights of their subordinates. Some courts already appear to be taking into account such institutional considerations. 129 To be sure, the participation of high-level political appointees bears many of these same benefits in terms of drawing upon the agency's expertise (indeed, agency heads often sign documents or interpretations that were drafted by or with the participation of career staff). But none of these benefits exist when political appointees deadlock.
Functionally, it is important to note that the proposed tailoring in the election context would simply encourage a judicial partnership with expert, internally insulated actors. It would not call for judges to abdicate their role under Skidmore in reviewing such documents, who would continue to consider other factors such as thoroughness and consistency, nor would it allow career staff to override a valid majority decision of the commissioners when they manage to secure a bipartisan consensus. Rather, the approach developed here would apply when agencies deadlock, and courts are called upon to resolve a statutory ambiguity. 125 At the same time, one might worry that this deference regime is inconsistent with legislative intent. If Congress had wanted to create an expert, non-partisan election administration agency with a permanent staff, it could have done so. Instead, it set up a politically appointed commission and protected against partisanship through a bi-partisan voting rule. The point that this objection misses, however, is that Congress also provided for judicial review of the agency's actions, sometimes explicitly as in the case of FEC enforcement proceedings or implicitly through a choice not to preclude review. 130 Thus, the familiar administrative law question is whether such reviewable statutory ambiguities are better understood as a delegation of interpretive authority to a court acting alone or rather as a cooperative endeavor between courts and expert agency actors when commissioners deadlock.
This interpretive approach is especially warranted given the comparative institutional weaknesses of courts relative to career staff or advisory commissions in this arena. While federal judges are politically insulated by virtue of Article III tenure and salary protections, empirical evidence demonstrates that they are hardly immune from partisan loyalties and, to the contrary, often vote in ways that favor their appointing party. 131 Moreover, most election administration litigation is fact-intensive and arises in a procedural posture that often requires courts to expedite their consideration of the claims based on incomplete records. As a result, judges must intervene without the requisite data to inform their decisions. These institutional weaknesses, coupled with the charged political nature of the cases render courts (and particularly the Supreme Court) ill-suited to resolve election-related disputes. 132 By contrast, career staff within administrative agencies also have various salary and tenure protections but, in addition, possess experience and expertise in administrating federal elections. Such staff are protected, for example, by the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act, which prohibits agency personnel decisions not taken on the basis of merit. 133 They also have "strict tenure guarantees, have no expressed ties to the administration or to Congress, and by law are to be politically neutral." 134 Furthermore, civil service salaries are protected from political appropriations decisions and the wages are fairly compressed within the federal pay structure. 135 Moreover, these internal agency actors also possess the resources to gather information across jurisdictions over longer periods of time. Indeed, it was this need for reliable data that originally spurred Congress to create a number of bureaucratic entities charged with researching cross-cutting election administration issues. In 1971, for example, Congress created the Office of Federal Elections within what is now known as the General Accountability Office. 136 It was moved in 1974 to the FEC where it eventually became known as the Office of Election Administration, before its staff and functions were finally later transferred to the EAC. 137 During its various evolutions, the office commissioned a number of influential election administration studies. 138 In addition, it created advisory boards and disseminated information to state and local election administrators. While housed in the EAC, the staff has formulated voluntary voting system guidelines, compiled data and reports on absentee ballots for overseas voters, and tested and certified voting system hardware and software. 139 In this manner, one of the main functions of federal election-related agencies has been to aggregate, develop, and solicit information about election practices across various states and even from overseas. Election administration decisions should take into account this accumulated storehouse of information and, in the context of statutory interpretation, should consider an interpretation's persuasiveness by virtue of the experience and insulated institutional role of its author. When the role is that of making recommendations to politically-appointed commissioners based on previous experience administering the statute, then judges would be especially wise to consider those views.
C. Implications and Objections
Returning now to Intertribal, it is useful to see how the Court's analysis might have differed when applying the institutional Skidmore Elections, 1973) . 139 Id. approach developed here. Namely, this view of Skidmore would have drawn the Court to consider the EAC executive director's institutional role and opinion letter in light of the agency's deadlock, instead of ignoring the letter altogether as a basis for decision. Recall that, although the EAC is vested with rulemaking authority, 140 the commission split along party lines as to how to resolve the statutory ambiguity: how must states "accept and use" the federal registration form? Because it ignored the EAC executive director's opinion, the Intertribal Court did not explicitly consider how much weight to give the letter, though the issue was raised in the merits briefs and the Court conceded that the statute was ambiguous. 141 Judge Kozinski, concurring in the Ninth Circuit's first panel decision below, however, did consider the question. First, he observed that the director's opinion letter lacked the "force of law" and therefore did not merit Chevron deference. 142 He further noted that courts did not normally grant deference to agency preemption determinations contained in informal opinion letters, but rather applied Skidmore. 143 While the Ninth Circuit majority acknowledged that Skidmore analysis could be appropriate, it declined to apply it on the grounds that the NVRA's legislative history and the EAC executive director's view were both consistent with the Ninth Circuit's holding. 144 In this manner, the panel, like the Supreme Court, interpreted the NVRA independently on its own and without reference to the EAC director's own well-reasoned analysis. 145 The EAC's executive director is a senior staff position with a renewable four-year appointment "responsible for implementing EAC policy and administering EAC's day-to-day operations." 146 He is appointed by a majority vote of the commission, whose members could only consider three nominations chosen from a search committee appointed by the EAC's Standards Board and Board of Advisors. 147 As such, the position requires the bipartisan vote of the commission only after nomination by expert advisory boards. The director's duties, in turn, include maintaining the federal voter registration form and answering questions regarding the application of the NVRA and HAVA consistent with EAC's guidance documents, regulations, advisories and policy statements. 148 Though the chair of the EAC is charged with providing administrative direction to the executive director, that direction is not to be undertaken without input from each commissioner. 149 As such, the EAC executive director has experience administering the agency's authorizing federal statutes across states and jurisdictions. Moreover, the executive director is likely to have a sound professional reputation as well as productive relationships with the state and local election officials who had nominated him (which the executive director in this case in fact did have). 150 Thus, there were multiple reasons to believe that norms of professionalism and expertise helped to bolster the independence of his position. In interpreting the NVRA, the Court would have benefited from considering the EAC executive director's interpretive opinion for its persuasiveness in light of the institutional position of its author. While it is true that the Court's substantive conclusion happened to align with that of the director in this case, such contingencies do not warrant the lack of judicial attention to insulated agency actors in future cases.
Turning now to other implications of the Skidmore approach developed here, courts should conversely be more hesitant to grant deference to agency actors that lack the structural protections against partisan influence of the kind that existed for the EAC's executive director. 151 Indeed, the increasing sense that the DOJ -recall, an executive agency with a single, appointed agency head -had politicized its interpretations under the Voting Rights Act (VRA) may help to explain the Supreme Court's general refusal to defer to the agency. 152 Indeed, one analysis describes the Court's recent approach as one of "anti-deference" and even "hostility." 153 Helping to explain this judicial skepticism, perhaps, was the perception that the DOJ had been issuing sub-regulatory documents that were evolving according to the administration's partisan affiliation. In 148 Id at 7. 149 To facilitate Section Five's preclearance process, for example, the DOJ first published an interpretive rule for public comment in 1971 under the Republican President Nixon. 154 The proposal initially provided that the Attorney General would object to a preclearance submission only if he or she affirmatively determined that the law would have a discriminatory effect or purpose. In practice, this required showing constituted a more onerous standard than had previously existed. The final guidelines issued a few months later, by contrast, called for the Attorney General to object even if the evidence was still indeterminate -a change prompted only by countervailing pressure from congressional and civil rights groups. 155 The evolution of the guidelines, with revisions in 1981 and 1987, continued to reflect attempts to track the shifting views of the administration in power. 156 For example, in 1985, Republican President Reagan's DOJ initially proposed that it would refuse preclearance under Section 5 using Section 2's result-oriented test, that is, only if the allegations showed by "clear and convincing evidence" that the change had a discriminatory result. 157 This policy shift would have reversed the previous burden of proof under Section 5 and set a new higher evidentiary standard. In response to legislative hearings and public criticism, however, the DOJ's finalized 1987 guidelines instead eliminated the burden shift and incorporated a results test with only a "clear" evidentiary standard. 158 More recently, in 2010, Democratic President Obama's DOJ published a notice proposing amendments for public comment. 159 Among other things, the proposal sought to reflect legislative changes to Section Five, which clarified that the term "purpose" included "any discriminatory purpose" and not just those that reflected an intention to retrogress, thus potentially expanding Section Five liability. Moreover, the regulations also clarified the nature of DOJ's "bailout" process for covered jurisdictions, including political subunits that were now eligible to bring a declaratory judgment suit under Section Five. 160 In April 2011, the DOJ issued the final rule as an interpretive rule without major changes from the proposal. 161 At the same time, numerous accounts have attested to the DOJ's increasingly politicized administration of the VRA across both Republican and Democratic administrations. Various reports have circulated, for instance, suggesting that Bush Administration DOJ officials had prohibited career staff attorneys from offering written recommendations in high-profile VRA determinations. 162 Not only did this new practice "mark[] a significant change in the procedures meant to insulate such decisions from politics," but it also followed on the heels of rare reversals by high-level political officials of career staff preclearance recommendations. 163 This dynamic of silencing or overruling internal dissent appears to have continued through the Obama Administration, 164 though recent DOJ officials have attempted to publicly distance themselves from such practices and profess to no longer prohibit written career staff opinions. 165 In this manner, the same executive agency which had been silencing its career attorneys had also been issuing guidance that sought to reflect the preferences of the political appointees in power. The Supreme Court's reluctance to grant deference under these circumstances, to agency actors that lacked internal mechanisms of political independence, would be consistent with the analysis developed here.
However persuasive the institutional Skidmore approach as an explanatory matter, one might still normatively object to it on the grounds 160 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District v Holder, 557 US 193 (2009) . 161 (2012) (reporting "the longstanding tradition in the Voting Section in both Republican and Democratic administrations for decades until it was changed in 2005 to exclude career attorneys and analysts from full participation in the process," including career staff who "were directed to no longer put their recommendations in writing"). 163 (Sept 11, 2012 ), online at http://pjmedia.com/jchristianadams/2012/09/11/dojdocuments-argued-for-sc-voter-id-approval (visited Jan 11, 2014) (President Obama's political appointees in the DOJ made the decision to object to preclearance of the South Carolina voter ID law over the recommendation of career DOJ lawyers and supervisors). 165 See Perez, 64 Rutgers L Rev at 940-41 (cited in note 162) (as Assistant Attorney General for DOJ's Civil Rights Division, announcing that DOJ had ended the previous practice of not allowing career staff attorneys from offering written recommendations in voting rights cases).
that it would result in the heightened probability for internal agency actor capture. Because courts would place a thumb on the scale for subregulatory guidance documents written by, say, senior career staff, independent general counsels, or advisory committee members, political parties would simply refocus their lobbying efforts accordingly. While this possibility is a real concern, the objection is muted first by the observation that reputations for election administrators are strongly dependent on their perceived independence from special interests and adherence to professional norms. 166 To be an effective election administrator depends on maintaining actual and perceived independence from parties and candidates.
In addition, the incentives for capture are mitigated by various federal laws limiting the influence of interest groups and parties on civil servants. The Pendleton Act, for example, prohibits agencies from making certain non-merit-based personnel actions and sends appeals of such decisions to an independent Merit Systems Protection Board. 167 Moreover, the Hatch Act restricts executive branch civil servants from engaging in partisan political activity. 168 If there was evidence in the record to suggest that the internally insulated agency actor was in fact captured, the proffered interpretation would be less persuasive under Skidmore.
By the same token, another objection might be that political appointees would now be more likely to increase their monitoring and control of staff memoranda, thereby undermining existing opportunities for publicly available expertise. If courts are more likely to defer to informal opinions from institutionally insulated actors, that is, then agency heads may simply reduce the amount of otherwise useful guidance, as occurred with the DOJ's silencing of career staff written opinions. More problematically, individual political appointees may even attempt to directly edit or manipulate the contents of such documents themselves.
In such circumstances, again, note that any evidence of political manipulation would render staff interpretations non-persuasive. As for potentially silenced expertise, political appointees are often constrained by powerful norms of independence and internal institutional practices like the DOJ written career staff opinions developed to instantiate them. 169 The DOJ, for its part, was heavily criticized in the media and elsewhere for the perceived politicization of the VRA. 170 In this manner, the credibility and reputation of election-related agencies may serve as a longer-run check on efforts to otherwise stifle internally insulated actors. Moreover, staff recommendations are not only made internally to high-level officials, but are also required by the need to provide guidance to outside regulated entities. As a result, there will always be an external demand for subregulatory guidance despite internal pressures not to issue any. Finally, such staff manipulations would be particularly difficult under multi-member commissions since other commissioners could object to such efforts.
One might nevertheless still be concerned about the possible dynamic effects of this deference regime. Perhaps judicial deference to senior career staff when they are structurally insulated would erode these norms of independence over time or essentially entrench partisanship even deeper within the agency. The best response may simply be a pragmatic one. The more an election-related agency loses its institutional credibility, either because of capture, corruption, or a failure to incorporate new data, the more likely other institutions like the courts or the legislature may be to step in to check it. This dynamic, as discussed, is one possible explanation for the Supreme Court's refusal to grant deference to an increasingly politicized DOJ. A similar argument has been made to explain the Court's withholding of deference from the EPA's refusal to curb greenhouse gas emissions -namely, because of the Court's perception that there had been high-level political interference with the expert, scientific judgments of EPA career staff. 171 More broadly, these worrisome possibilities may be alleviated by other strategic internal incentives. Namely, the commissioners tempted to silence or otherwise unduly influence the recommendations of their staff are faced with a tradeoff between reaching a bipartisan decision and gaining Chevron deference, which favors the agency, or settling for Skidmore deference, which leaves interpretive authority with the courts. Faced with this choice, the appointed commissioners can gain more deference by securing a majority agreement, instead of leaving open the ambiguity to the uncertainties of Skidmore as a result of partisan deadlock. In this manner, there are relative incentives for commissioners to avoid administrative impasse and devote resources to finding bipartisan interpretations rather than micromanaging informal staff documents.
IV. FEDERAL ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
Ongoing litigation regarding Arizona's proof-of-citizenship requirements, as in a recent case brought against the EAC itself, will continue to highlight the intersection between federal election and administrative law. 172 Among other issues will be the question identified by Justice Scalia in Intertribal -now arising out of legislative, as opposed to administrative, deadlock: Can agencies without any appointed commissioners still act on behalf of the agency? To date, in response to a court order, the professional staff of the EAC has issued a memorandum arguing that the staff possesses the sub-delegated authority under the circumstances to resolve state requests to amend the federal form. 173 In light of recent changes to filibuster rules, the issue may soon become moot as a practical matter if Congress moves ahead on potential EAC nominations. 174 Other important issues to be resolved include whether and when the EAC's decisions can be considered final, reviewable actions under the APA.
While this article's analysis of the comparative institutional competence of insulated career staff may help to bolster the EAC's arguments going forward, this final Part offers some broader reflections about how administrative law may be adapted in the electoral contextthemes to be more fully developed in future work. Indeed, administrative law, as traditionally conceived, is trans-substantive. It presumes principles generally applicable across a number of agencies and formulates its doctrines accordingly. 175 There are many reasons to think, however, that such doctrines should be adapted to the election administration context in ways that recognize the domain's unique concerns.
In recent years, judges and scholars alike have begun to recognize the potential wisdom of such tailored approaches. Richard Levy and Robert Glicksman, for example, observe a phenomenon they call "agency-specific precedents." 176 Precedents are agency-specific when a court only cites them for a particular agency in other cases involving that agency, even when the cited principles are supposedly general in nature. What is particularly striking about the practice is that courts have begun to modify these principles to accommodate particular agency characteristics. 177 One traditional articulation of arbitrary-and-capricious review, for example, asks "whether the [agency] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." 178 In the narrow contexts of the Federal Communications Commission and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, however, Levy and Glicksman note that courts regularly invoke a different verbal formulation -simply that of "reasoned decisionmaking." 179 They argue that this alternative approach emphasizes a more rational decision-making process, as opposed to a focus on the substance of the decision itself. One potential explanation they offer is that the agencies at issue engage in ratemaking and licensing in regulated industries, which place a greater emphasis on procedural protections. 180 To the extent courts are already de facto adapting administrative law principles to the shared concerns of particular agencies, a related possibility is that such customization should recognize the unique problems of federal election administration. The idea arises from the analogous argument that the exceptional nature of elections warrants particularized constitutional doctrines. In this view, the First Amendment, for example, should give some kinds of electoral speech less protection relative to non-electoral speech in order to facilitate the heightened contest of ideas during election season. 181 The Equal Protection Clause too has received election-specific modifications. The Supreme Court's recent redistricting cases, for instance, have allowed for more race-conscious line-drawing than in other equal protection arenas, with the Court adopting a "predominant" factor rather than a "motivating" factor test for identifying impermissible racial motive. 182 One rationale is that voters voluntarily identify by race when forming political organizations, thus necessitating the recognition of legitimate group interests in the redistricting process. 183 Similarly, Baker v. Carr's one-person, one-vote standard is unique as one of the only contexts in which strict scrutiny is applied in the absence of a discriminatory purpose or suspect classification and has "imposed a mathematical rigor on the redistricting process that no other species of equal protection law required." 184 Partisan gerrymandering doctrines too allow the state to intentionally disadvantage the otherwise constitutionally protected characteristic of political affiliation. 185 These election-specific constitutional doctrines also have statutory analogues. Richard Hasen, for instance, identifies "democracy canons" of interpretation in state courts and advocates their use in federal settings as well. 186 Such canons generally seek to "give effect to the will of the majority" and "prevent the disenfranchisement of legal voters" when election-related statutes are otherwise ambiguous. 187 When applied, they usually counsel in favor of allowing ballots to be cast and counted and to enable candidates to appear on ballots. 188 Just as constitutional and statutory concerns might take on novel dimensions when elections are at issue, so too might administrative law's worries about non-arbitrariness, transparency, and reasoned decision-making, among others. What works wholesale, that is, may need retail-level refinement.
Indeed, one of administrative law's central concerns is how to legitimate government action by an unelected bureaucracy through doctrines and procedures grounded in both political accountability and expertise. Along the first dimension, the non-delegation doctrine, for instance, requires that broad delegations of legislative power are constrained by an "intelligible principle" 189 to which legislators can be held responsible. Given Congress' broad delegations in practice, however, the President has also become an important locus of accountability, particularly through his appointment, removal, and review powers. 190 Central to these accountability-grounded accounts is the notion that federal elections can help to ensure that regulatory policies are responsive to the democratic will.
In the context of election regulation, however, the political control model falters. Instead of relying on elections as an exogenous check on the regulatory process, election administration influences the election outcomes themselves. As a result, there is a potential circularity: the very source of legitimacy for the agency action is a function of the agency action itself. In these circumstances, elections are a less reliable check on agency decisionmaking when they instead reflect partisan efforts to distort signals of voter approval or disapproval. 191 Related are familiar fears of partisan entrenchment, the worry that an appointed administrator can manipulate the voting process to keep their favored party in power. 192 Potentially more appropriate, then, is another familiar framework for justifying the delegation of policymaking authority: one grounded in the agency's superior expertise and experience. Hard look review helps to ensure that agencies make factual and scientific judgments based on the evidence available in the record. 193 Indeed, as this article has argued, federal election administration can benefit greatly from states' experiences as well as from lessons learned from previous federal election cycles. 194 Many of the recent debates about voter identification revolve around contested facts regarding the true rates of voter fraud or racial disenfranchisement. In response, some have proposed information-forcing reforms such as electoral impact statements 195 or the application of risk regulation principles. 196 In this manner, the legitimacy of a federal election agency depends heavily on its ability to rationalize and inform electoral administration.
At the same time, purely non-partisan rationales grounded solely in expertise may be naïve in a context where administrators are appointed or hired by individuals with partisan affiliations. 197 Many election regulations also require line-drawing exercises -as in Intertribal's question of how much information is "necessary" to enforce voter qualifications -which often cannot be answered by reference to pure expertise, but are rather discretionary exercises of judgment. As a result, election administration may also need other sources of legitimacy.
Perhaps one possibility suggested by this article's analysis is that of bipartisanship, the extent to which a regulatory decision has been agreed to by both political parties in a two-party system. This criteria would mirror the structural choices made by Congress for agencies like the FEC and EAC, as discussed. Relative to single party domination, bipartisan decisions may be less suspect given the greater prospect of decisions based on the public interest rather than narrowly partisan grounds. Since they require the approval of two parties, bi-partisan decisions are more likely to concern the electoral system as a whole, rather than attempts to disadvantage a particular party. Privileging bipartisan requirements may also contribute to greater stability over time since they render less likely sudden policy shifts due to contingent situations of unified government. 198 The danger with bipartisan decisions, however, arises from the concern that political parties will collude to weaken the political process at the expense of voters. Some have argued that this danger is particularly acute in the redistricting context, though empirical evidence may suggest that such concerns are overstated. 199 Because of such worries, neither bipartisan, nor expert, non-partisan considerations may be sufficient legitimizing rationales on their own. Rather, perhaps they must operate in tandem as proxies to guard against arbitrary regulatory policies designed to entrench. A lack of bipartisanship, for instance, might invite a heightened judicial review of the evidence-based rationale for a change in electoral regulation. Conversely, the presence of bipartisanship might warrant only ordinary arbitrary-and-capricious review of the underlying supporting data and evidence. 200 
CONCLUSION
Prior to last Term, election law observers had presciently predicted that the future of voting rights would shift from the VRA's antidiscrimination model towards more national, uniform approaches that "better fit" the increasingly recognized need for consistency across electoral jurisdictions. 201 Recent events such as the establishment of a presidential commission to address federal election administration further signal the potentially expanding regulatory presence in this domain. 202 As the Intertribal litigation suggests, a federal approach also brings it with the greater need for high-quality information and data to justify alternative regulatory approaches. This need is highlighted by the self-professed difficulties courts face in gaining this information.
To confront this challenge, this article has sought to highlight some potentially fruitful intersections between administrative and election law. Faced with deadlocks unique to the election context, the analysis developed an approach to Skidmore deference that would push courts to focus on the information and expertise gained by experienced institutional actors who could bring a more birds-eye view across various electoral jurisdictions. Future litigation arising out of Intertribal will continue to test the limits of judges' abilities to sort through limited factual records. At the same time, it will rightly bring the dispute firmly back to administrative arenas with the tools and doctrines that can help to foster the legitimacy that federal election administration demands.
